A. INTRODUCTION
In 1822, discussing the question whether paying another's debt extinguishes it, Baron Hume suggested that "it may be very long before such a question come to trial". 1 
Come to trial it eventually did in the Outer House case of Whitbread Group Plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2).
2 This article considers three important questions in Scots law raised directly or indirectly by that case, namely: and bars division to a third party, namely Fairbar Ltd, as part of an internal reorganisation within a group of companies.
3
On 27 May Fairbar sent to Goldapple's bankers, the Royal Bank of Scotland, a cheque in favour of Goldapple, for the amount of rent due, for crediting to Goldapple's account. The cheque was cleared on 3 June and credited to Goldapple's account. On 31 May Goldapple's solicitors telephoned Whitbread's solicitors to inform them that the payment would be returned because it had been received from the third party Fairbar rather than the tenant, Whitbread. The judge found that the result of discussions between the parties' agents was an agreement that the Fairbar cheque should be returned by Goldapple and that thereafter Whitbread should be given an opportunity to make payment of the rent by another means. On Goldapple's instructions, RBS returned the payment to Fairbar, which received it on 11 June. When this cheque was repaid, Whitbread made another attempt to pay the rent, on 12 June, but failed because of a mistake in the account number. On 6 July Whitbread's new attempt to pay the rent (by CHAPS) also failed because by then Goldapple had instructed RBS not to accept it.
Meantime Goldapple began proceedings to irritate the lease by serving a preirritancy notice on 11 June and a notice of irritancy on 29 June, and by raising an action of declarator of irritancy on 6 July. Whitbread reacted by raising an action in the Court of Session of reduction of the two notices and declarator that the lease continued to exist. Lord Drummond Young rejected Goldapple's argument that Fairbar's payment of 27 May was not a valid payment of the rent due by Whitbread. He held that Fairbar had paid the money as an ad hoc agent for Whitbread.
Unfortunately, counsel omitted to cite to the court the main Scottish authorities which do and should govern the situation of payment of another's debt, 4 so that Lord Drummond Young felt bound (in his words) "to go back to first principles". 5 In his impressive judgment he developed a novel theory of ad hoc agency (which he defined as "an agency relationship that comes into existence for the purpose of a single transaction only") 6 on which he has relied in subsequent cases unrelated to payment of another's debt. 7 In Whitbread however he was 3 While the accounting and payment functions were being transferred, all payments were temporarily halted. 4 Para 10. 5 Para 11. 6 Para 13. misled by counsel's omission into thinking that this branch of Scots law was a tabula rasa and a golden opportunity to develop the law by building on these sources was missed.
(2) The factual circumstances held to raise an inference of ad hoc agency
From the following facts Lord Drummond Young inferred that Fairbar was acting as Whitbread's ad hoc agent. 8 First, though Fairbar was in occupation, the obligation to pay the rent was Whitbread's, not Fairbar's. The tenant's interest had not been assigned, and could not be effectually assigned without Goldapple's consent as landlords. Second, the business transfer agreement between Whitbread and and Fairbar specifically recognised that the obligation to pay the rent remained with Whitbread and obliged Fairbar to reimburse Whitbread for the rent.
9 Third, the payment made on 27 May was clearly intended to discharge Whitbread's obligation to pay the rent.
Lord Drummond Young did not think that Fairbar had made the payment of 27 May "in its own right" because the business transfer agreement recognised that the obligation to pay rent remained Whitbread's. The use of a Fairbar cheque was administratively convenient, in that all debts of Whitbread's pubs and bars division payable after 10 May were paid using Fairbar cheques. The payments themselves were effected on Fairbar's behalf by employees of Whitbread. When the arrangements governing such payments were looked at in the light of the business transfer agreement, it was clear that the intention was that Fairbar funds should be used to pay a Whitbread debt. The judge deemed this to be wholly consistent with Fairbar's acting as agent for Whitbread in respect of such payment.
(3) The theory of ad hoc agency Lord Drummond Young summarised his view of the law applicable as follows:
10
[11] Although a number of authorities on the payment of debts were cited by counsel in the course of their arguments, none appeared to govern the present situation. In these 8 Para 19, head 1. 9 This agreement purported to transfer "the beneficial interest" of Whitbread in the relevant assets to Fairbar and to procure that "the legal interest" (sic) should be transferred in due course. Lord Drummond Young commented at para 18 that: "The distinction between legal and beneficial interest is a fundamental part of the English law of property, but it obviously forms no part of Scots law." He pointed out that there was no trust which alone in Scots law can create a beneficial interest. "Consequently the tenant's interest under the lease . . . was not transferred in any way by the business transfer agreement." 10 Whitbread at paras 11 to 15.
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payment of another's debt 61 circumstances it is necessary to go back to first principles and analyse the requirements of a valid payment . . .
[12]. . . I am of opinion that the following principles are relevant to the Fairbar cheque of 27 May. First, it is necessary to keep in mind the elementary point that the purpose of payment is normally to discharge a debt, and nothing more. Consequently, there is generally no need to have regard to the wider context of the contract under which the debt arises; to do so would in my view introduce unnecessary complexity into what should be a very straightforward area of law. One exception exists, however; if the person paying the debt attempts to attach conditions to his payment, it may then be necessary to look at the wider contractual context.
[13] Secondly, it is common for payment to be made by someone other than the debtor in the relevant obligation. This is particularly true of members of a family where, for example, a husband may pay his wife's debt, or a wife her husband's. The same is true of groups of companies, where it is not unusual for one company in the group to pay a debt owed by another company to a person outside the group. The key to the analysis of such cases lies in my opinion in the concept of ad hoc agency, that is to say, an agency relationship that comes into existence for the purpose of a single transaction only. Where, accordingly, one person makes payment of another's debt, he normally does so as the agent of the debtor for the purpose of that particular transaction, namely the payment of the debt. That is in my opinion the natural inference from two facts, (i) the existence of a debt owed by the debtor and (ii) the fact that payment is made in order to discharge that particular debt. There is no reason to suppose from the mere fact of payment that the person making payment does so on his own behalf; he has no obligation to discharge. The obvious inference is accordingly that he makes payment on behalf of the debtor. That creates the relationship of ad hoc agency.
[14] Thirdly, if the correct analysis is ad hoc agency, payment by the agent discharges his principal's debt. That follows from ordinary principles of the law of agency. Fourthly, if the foregoing analysis is correct, there is no reason that the creditor should be entitled to refuse payment by an ad hoc agent, because the agent's act is attributed to his principal; the payment must therefore be treated by the law as made by the principal. The corollary of this proposition is that, if the creditor does in fact refuse payment made by an ad hoc agent, the debtor cannot be prejudiced by such refusal. What that means in practice is that the debtor must be given a further reasonable opportunity to pay the debt. That is of great importance in the present case. It is critical, however, that all that the ad hoc agent should do is pay the debtor; if he attempts to attach conditions to his payment, the creditor may be entitled to refuse the payment. Moreover, if the person making the payment purports to do so as principal rather than agent, the inference of agency is negated, and the creditor might be entitled to refuse payment.
[15] Fifthly, in some cases, of which the present is an example, the creditor may be concerned that by accepting payment from someone other than the debtor he may be regarded as recognising wider rights in the person who makes payment, by personal bar or otherwise. In the present case, the defenders and their legal advisers were concerned that they might, by accepting payment from Fairbar, be taken to recognise Fairbar as the tenant under the lease. On the analysis of ad hoc agency no such inference should be drawn, at least if the payment is unconditional and there is nothing in the way that payment is made to suggest that the person making payment is purporting to act as principal. Nevertheless, in such a case the creditor can protect himself by accepting payment but writing either to the person making payment or to the debtor to negate any such inference from the acceptance of payment. In my opinion an acceptance of payment can be made conditional in this way, just as a payment itself may be conditional. If the other party rejects the condition, of course, the payment will be a nullity.
The question arises whether the finding of ad hoc agency in Whitbread was on the one hand ultimately a fiction or whether on the other hand it was constituted by tacit agreement and represented commercial reality. We revert to that question in Part C below.
B. PAYMENT OF ANOTHER'S DEBT
(1) The Scottish sources on payment of another's debt
What are the sources on payment of another's debt in Scots law? The primary sources ought not to be in doubt. Under the fundamental institutional scheme of our system of private law, the power of a third party to extinguish another's debt by unauthorised payment is, logically enough, part of the law on extinction of obligations, and has been since Roman law. 11 The law governing the right of the third party to claim reimbursement of his expenditure from the debtor is more complex. Depending on the precise facts, one or more of a number of legal regimes can be involved including unjustified enrichment (recompense); negotiorum gestio (management of another's affairs); assignation ex lege of the debt to the third party; or subrogation of the third party to the creditor's rights; and so forth. On the facts of Whitbread, the principal contenders are unjustified enrichment or negotiorum gestio, whose different requirements are outlined below.
12
The most recent Scottish research on the third party's power of payment is not to be found in texts on "extinction of obligations" (where one would naturally look for it) but in the linked context of unjustified enrichment and negotiorum gestio.
13
The linkage arises because as Birks and Beatson once observed "the problems which arise in the law of restitution where one person pays another's debt cannot be solved in the absence of a stable analysis of the effects of such a payment on the relationship between the creditor and debtor".
14 In other words, to evolve a set of principles on unjustified enrichment, or a negotiorum gestor's claim, for 11 J Inst 3.29. For the details of the Scots law see B (2) and (3) below. 12 B (4) and (5) payment of another's debt, one needs to know whether the unauthorised payment extinguishes the debt and thereby enriches the debtor. This article does not consider (except incidentally) cases where the third party pays the creditor as a co-obligant or cautioner of the debtor thereby imposing an obligation of relief on the latter, or where an insurer of the creditor pays the creditor under a contract of indemnity and is subrogated to the creditor's action against the debtor. These involve distinct regimes with rules of their own rather than the general principles of unjustified enrichment 15 and require separate treatment. Nor does this article consider the controversial issue whether payment by a bank of its customer's stopped cheque discharges the customer's debt. 16 This is a special area of law since a bank pays its customer's cheque in order to implement its customer's mandate and not in order to pay any debt of its customer; for aught the bank knows or needs to know, there may be no debt. 17 Finally the article does not deal with unauthorised performance of another's obligation ad factum praestandum, which requires extra safeguards for the creditor.
(2) The first main issue: the power of a third party to discharge another's debt While there is a conflict of Scottish institutional authority on a third party's power to extinguish another's debt, 18 the weight of Scottish authority favours the view (in consonance with the civilian tradition) 19 that the payment of another's pecuniary debt discharges that debt if either the debtor or creditor agree and certain conditions safeguarding the creditor's autonomy are fulfilled. 20 Following Justinian's institutional scheme, 21 Bankton, Hume and Bell, together with Rankine's edition of Erskine's Principles, all deal with the power to extinguish another's debt in passages on liberation from or extinction of obligations 22 -precisely where one would naturally expect to find it. Expressly citing Justinian's Institutes, 23 Bankton 24 and Bell 25 state that a third party can by an unauthorised payment of another's debt extinguish that debt whether the debtor knows of it or not or (at least in some circumstances) even against his will. It is true that Kames and Hume took a different view, 26 but they did not cite any Scottish authority and have had no discernible influence on the development of this branch of law.
The most authoritative statement of the rule is that of Bell: 27 Payment, to the effect of extinguishing the obligation, may be made not only by the debtor himself, but by anyone acting for the debtor: or even by a stranger, where the debt is pecuniary, and due, and demanded; 28 or where any penal effect may arise from delay; or where the creditor has no interest in demanding performance by the proper debtor. The debtor cannot prevent any stranger from paying and demanding an assignation if the creditor chooses to grant it. But the creditor cannot be compelled to grant an assignation, unless the debtor shall consent, and the granting of the assignation shall not interfere with any other interest of the creditor himself.
This passage was applied by Lord Anderson in Reid v Lord Ruthven
29 although in that case the basis of the third party's power was said to be negotiorum gestio. Bell's rule is very relevant to the Whitbread case because it is (or was until that case) trite law that the general rules on extinction of obligations apply to payment of rent. 30 Bell's rule is followed by Rankine Bell, 36 but culminating in the punch-line: "In sum, thirdparty performance can only be declined where both creditor and debtor object to it".
37
It should not be thought that this rule is a relic of a bygone age. It is the general rule in civilian 38 and mixed 39 systems, 40 and in such European documents as the DCFR and PECL. 41 As Lord President Rodger pointed out in the Caledonia North Sea Ltd case, under English law payment by "a volunteer" does not discharge the debt unless adopted by the debtor. 42 Famously, this is one of the fault-lines dividing the civil law and common law traditions. 43 There is no sign that the civilian and mixed systems wish to give this up; rather some English legal commentators argue that the English approach should be liberalised.
(3) Safeguards for creditor and debtor in cases of payment of another's pecuniary debt (a) Safeguards for the creditor
As mentioned above, payment of another's debt is one of the rare categories of "imposed enrichment" in the civil law tradition generally and Scots law in particular. However, the contrast with the English law tradition shows that there must be strong policy reasons to outweigh the loss of individual autonomy involved and adequate control devices to guard against unjust obtruding of unwanted benefits and officious intermeddling. The need for safeguards is less strong in cases of payment of another's pecuniary debt than in performance of an obligation ad factum praestandum but safeguards are still necessary. In this article we are only concerned with pecuniary debts. 45 Bell's Principles § 557 does not uphold a completely unfettered power to discharge another's debt. On the contrary, in a masterpiece of compression, Bell lays down briefly four important requirements which have to be satisfied before a stranger's payment will extinguish another's debt namely:
(i) where it is pecuniary, due and demanded; 46 (ii) where any penal effect may arise from delay; (iii) where the creditor has no interest in demanding performance by the proper debtor; and (iv) where either the creditor or debtor concurs, or at least does not object, to the third party's payment.
Multum in parvo.
47 These requirements are safeguards mainly for the creditor, and appear to be cumulative in the sense that all of them must be satisfied before the third party's payment will operate a discharge of the debt. In some cases the judges tend to conflate analysis of the power to pay another's debt, which concerns extinction of the debtor's obligation, with analysis of the payer's right to require an assignation of the debt, which concerns the third party's right of reimbursement from the debtor. It is the first aspect which concerns us here. It is well established that the right to demand an assignation on making payment of another's debt extends beyond the case of a cautioner or co-obligant with a right of relief to include a third party who acquires a right of recompense against the debtor on paying his debt without obligation to do so. 48 It is thought that the latter cases afford good authority for the existence of a third party's power to pay another's debt, though in some cases it is difficult to determine whether judicial dicta as to the limits of the right to demand an assignation are also intended to be limits on the third party's power to pay another's debt and vice versa.
The first safeguard for the creditor's autonomy is that the debt must be "pecuniary, due, and demanded". So for instance in Smith v Gentles 49 Lord Mackenzie referred to an unidentified earlier case where the Second Division:
. . . took this distinction -that a third party was not entitled to say to a creditor, here is payment of your debt, assign your security to me; but that, where the creditor chose to attempt to enforce payment by execution, he might then be compelled to assign his security to a third party paying the debt. A third party is not entitled to say to a creditor, I want an investment; give me yours -here is payment of your debt. While a creditor is content to retain his debt, he may do so; but where he seeks to enforce payment, it is a different case. . .
In Whitbread, the rent was indeed pecuniary, due and demanded. The second of Bell's requirements safeguarding the creditor's autonomy is "where any penal effect may arise from delay". Such are cases where delay in payment will result in the execution of diligence or sequestration in bankruptcy 47 or the enforcement of a hypothec 50 or voluntary security, 51 or the lapse of an insurance policy through non-payment of premiums, 52 or the incurring of remedies for breach of contract, and so forth. In Whitbread, the result of the landlord's refusal to accept the third party's tender of payment would have been as drastic a civil penalty as one can find in Scots private law, namely, irritancy of the lease. So this requirement was also well satisfied. There are precedents in old cases of 1744 and 1841 where it was held that a landlord was bound to accept a tender of arrears of rent by a third party and to grant a discharge on receiving payment of the arrears though he was not bound to assign his right of hypothec to the third party.
53
The third safeguard for the creditor's autonomy mentioned by Bell was "where the creditor has no interest in demanding performance by the proper debtor". In Whitbread, subject to one proviso, Goldapple had no interest in receiving the rent from Whitbread rather than from Fairbar other than the interest in irritating the lease and, as we know from the second requirement, that is not a legitimate interest which can be taken into account so as to bar discharge of the debt by the third party. The proviso is that the landlords Goldapple were concerned that they might, by accepting payment from Fairbar, be taken to recognise Fairbar as the tenant under the lease. Lord Drummond Young held that, under his theory of ad hoc agency, no such inference should be drawn, at least if the tender of payment is unconditional; that the creditor could protect himself by accepting payment subject to a condition (which could be notified in a letter to the third party or debtor) expressly negating such an inference; and that if the other party were to reject the condition attached by the creditor to his acceptance, the payment would be a nullity. 54 If the creditor were unjustifiably to refuse to accept the third party's tender of payment, the debtor could not be prejudiced thereby which would mean in practice that the debtor must be given a further It is submitted that these just and practical rules, designed by Lord Drummond Young to strike a fair and reasonable balance between the interests of all the parties, could and should be seen as a manifestation of the third safeguard described in § 557 of Bell's Principles rather than of a new doctrine of ad hoc agency. This safeguard is very important in some commercial contexts, such as in a construction contract. Under the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) forms, the effect of one of the standard clauses is to prohibit the employer from assigning the benefit (including the right to particular debts) to a third party. 56 Bell's fourth safeguard is that either the creditor or debtor concur, or at least do not object, to the third party's payment. In Whitbread, the debtor Whitbread concurred in the payment by the third party, Fairbar.
It follows that all the classic requirements of Bell's test were satisfied in that case so that the debt was extinguished by Fairbar's payment on 27 May 2001. Accordingly it was at best unnecessary to develop a doctrine of ad hoc agency to reach the same result.
(b) Safeguards for the debtor
The main safeguards for the debtor arise on the assumption that he will become liable to reimburse the third party intervener. First, suppose the third party is not the debtor's friend but an enemy. If this vague objection constituted a serious risk, however, it would long ago have precluded the assignability of debts. But it does not have that effect 57 and accordingly the objection does not seem strong enough to require a safeguard. Secondly, suppose the debtor has a defence or counterclaim or a right to suspend contractual performance which he loses on payment of his debt. Where the debtor has a defence, he can resist the third party payer's claim for reimbursement (recompense) on the ground that he was not enriched by the payment. This might involve determining whether the defence is made out in proceedings in which the payer was not a party. 58 Where the debtor can plead a counterclaim against the original creditor, it must in principle still be pleadable in any enrichment-based proceedings by the third party for reimbursement so that the latter is to that extent subrogated to the position of the original creditor. 59 The procedural details of this require exploration. Finally, some authorities hold that a third party can discharge another's debt even against the debtor's express wishes and claim reimbursement. 60 In the South African Taylam case, 61 a restaurateur who had paid a debt due by a previous owner of his restaurant to his wholesale supplier, in order to secure the continuation of supplies, was held enitled to recover the debt from the previous owner. The case is controversial 62 but the result seems just in the particular circumstances.
(4) Second main issue: claims by third party payer against debtor under unjustified enrichment, negotiorum gestio, assignation or subrogation
Assuming that the third party's payment has discharged another's pecuniary debt without the debtor's authority, the main bases upon which the third party can claim reimbursement of his expenditure from the debtor are unjustified enrichment or negotiorum gestio. 63 These have different requirements. In unjustified enrichment "the pursuers must show that the defenders have been enriched at their expense, that there is no legal justification for the enrichment and that it would be equitable to compel the defenders to redress the enrichment". 64 There are three elements in the cause of action: (1) the enrichment of the defender; (2) at the pursuer's expense; and (3) no legal justification for the enrichment. The fourth element is actually a defence under which the defender may escape decree if he establishes that it would be inequitable for the court to compel redress. 65 It is submitted that this test has superseded the older and less authoritative five-point Varney test of liability for recompense. 66 To continue to apply the latter test is a recipe for confusion and would be inconsistent with the decision in Shilliday v Smith 67 that recompense is merely a remedy and not a substantive cause of action. Payment of another's debt is one of three categories in which a claim lies for "imposed enrichment", the other two being the bona fide possessor's improvement of another's property and negotiorum gestio 68 though the latter is not always or even usually an enrichment claim. 69 The prerequisites for negotiorum gestio are that (1) the management must be of another's affairs; and (2) unauthorised; (3) the principal (dominus negotii) must be absent, or unaware of the management, or incapax; (4) the gestor must act to benefit the principal intending to donate his labour but to recover his expenses; and (5) the management must have been useful when originally carried out.
70
In negotiorum gestio the measure of the gestor's recovery is the amount of his expenses (if useful, at least initially) which may exceed the principal's enrichment. Payment of another's debt is one of the most common and characteristic types of negotiorum gestio.
71
It seems that the remedy of assignation or subrogation may be available to a third party who pays another's debt, even though the third party is not a cautioner or co-obligant of the debtor. It has advantages for a third party because it may give the third party a security in ranking on the debtor's estate.This raises a notorious conundrum: how can the debt be discharged by the payment and at the same time be kept alive so as to be assignable either by writing or by operation of law? The theory stated by Bell for cautioners and co-obligants is as follows:
72
Payment made by one interested in the debt (as co-obligant or surety) will take away the right of the creditor but will not extinguish the debt of the principal obligant. The person so paying is entitled to an assignation, to the effect of operating his relief.
There is a view that this theory may also apply to payments by third parties who are not cautioners or co-obligants but "strangers" because in certain circumstances they are entitled to an assignation of the creditor's rights. 73 But that seems inconsistent with the third party's right of recourse against the debtor 67 Various theories such as "reviving subrogation", which lie outside this article, may be advanced.
75
The question of Whitbread's recompense of Fairbar for paying Whitbread's debt did not arise in the Whitbread case. One would hope that if that issue had arisen it would have been resolved by principles of unjustified enrichment rather than on the basis of an agent's right to reimbursement from his principal under an implied contract of ad hoc agency.
(5) Precedents where third party's payment to creditor was reimbursed by debtor
Sometimes the third party's purpose in paying another's debt is to protect the interest of the debtor, sometimes to protect the third party's own interest, and sometimes the motives are mixed. In Whitbread, Fairbar's motives may well have been mixed. The results, however, are the same, as the following precedents (in all of which the third party is neither cautioner nor co-obligant and pays without contractual obligation or intention of donation) show.
(a) Third party's payment of another's debt to protect the debtor's interest
In the following cases the primary aim of the payment was to protect the debtor's interest. (a) The third party pays (or provides) aliment to an alimentary creditor and claims recompense under unjustified enrichment or reimbursement under negotiorum gestio from the alimentary debtor whose obligation of aliment he has discharged. 76 Before the advent of social security and the narrowing of the class of alimentary debtors, this was a common case. (b) The third party provides aliment for a pauper who is entitled to poor relief and recovers its cost from the liable poor law authority.
77 (c) The third party, the employer of a worker in a foreign country, on repatriating him, discharged his debts incurred there and claimed recompense from him. 78 (d) The third parties pay back to the lender the amount of a loan due by their employee, recover some of the loan by deduction from his salary and then sue for the outstanding balance after the employee leaves their employment.
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(e) A trustee who pays in a personal capacity from his own pocket premiums due upon the trust estate's insurance policy is entitled to recompense to the extent that the estate is lucratus by the trustee's expenditure. In this type of case the analogy of the trustee's lien under English law was rejected: "The only ground, according to our law, on which a trustee so acting can recover his advances, is that of recompense, which implies that his right to recover depends on his being able to show that the estate is lucratus by his expenditure". 80 Likewise a solicitor pays in a personal capacity from his own pocket premiums due upon his client's insurance policy. 81 All these cases proceed on the premise that a third party can discharge another's debt by unauthorised payment.
(b) Third party's payment to protect his or her own interest
In the following cases the third party's unauthorised payment was made to protect his or her own interest. (a) There are cases where if the debt is not discharged, the third party may lose a proprietary or possessory right or expectancy, as where a wife recovers recompense in respect of premiums advanced by her to trustees to keep up an assurance policy on her husband's life, over which she has a spes successionis.
82 (b) Then there is the case where a third party, the ordinary creditor of a tenant, tenders payment of the tenant's arrears of rent to the landlord (in order, for example, to disburden the tenancy of the landlord's hypothec prior to the creditor executing an ordinary poinding of the invecta et illata). The landlord is bound to grant a discharge on payment of the arrears though he is not bound to assign his right of hypothec to the creditor. 83 A classic case is where a sub-tenant pays the rent of the principal tenant in order to prevent his own consequential removing. (c) Likewise in the feudal system a third party was entitled to tender payment of a vassal's arrears of feuduty to the feudal superior and the superior was bound to grant a discharge of the arrears but was not bound to assign the superior's hypothec or other remedies to the third party. 84 (d) Where a life assurance policy insuring a husband's life for the benefit of his wife was purportedly assigned to two creditors of the husband in security of his debts to them, and it subsequently turned out that the assignation in security was void, it was held that the purported assignees were entitled, under the principle of recompense, to repayment, out of the policy proceeds, of the premiums which they had paid in good faith to keep the life policy in force. Lord Mackenzie drew an analogy with recompense for a bona fide possessor for improving another's property. 85 But the assignees' payment of premiums might have been characterised as payment of debts due by the trustees under the policy which, like a bona fide possessor's improvements, is a form of "imposed enrichment". Normally however the third party's payment is not mistaken. None of these cases assumes the existence of ad hoc agency.
C. WHITBREAD AND RELATED ISSUES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AGENCY LAW (1) Whitbread as the first step in the creation of a new doctrine
Whitbread is the first case in which the phrase "ad hoc agency" has been used: it is not a term of art in Scots agency law. In the two years following the case, Lord Drummond Young applied the same concept in two other cases: Laurence
McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland 86 and John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Ltd.
87 Although the facts of each of the three cases differ, a common thread unites them. In each the problem facing the pursuer was caused by the doctrine of the separate legal personality of companies.
(a) Laurence McIntosh Ltd
In the first of these cases the pursuer, Laurence McIntosh Ltd, was a joinery business, which originally traded as a partnership called Laurence McIntosh & Sons. In 1998 the partnership had entered into a subcontract ("the Works Contract") with the principal contractor Balfour Beatty, in terms of which McIntosh Ltd raised an action against both Balfour Beatty and the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland, they faced a significant difficulty: because the newly incorporated company was not a party to the Works Contract, they had no title to sue under that contract. Realising that a significant error had occurred, an assignation transferring the whole right, title and interest in the Works Contract from the partnership to the new company was executed and intimated to Balfour Beatty. Its effect was purportedly backdated to April 2000. Significantly, the execution of this assignation post-dated the raising of the action by Laurence McIntosh Ltd.
Lord Drummond Young held that the assignation had not retrospectively cured the company's lack of title to sue. 88 All was not lost for the company, however. Lord Drummond Young applied his solution of ad hoc agency. This allowed him to treat the newly formed company as the agent of the partnership. All rights under the Works Contract therefore remained with the partnership. Acting as agent, the company had carried out a number of tasks for the partnership. The payments made under the Works Contract into the company's bank account had been received by the company acting as agent for the partnership. This being the case, those payments validly discharged the liability of the payers. 89 The company, acting as agent, had also presented the claim document under the Works Contract on behalf of the partnership. 90 Problems of title to sue were, in effect, overcome by using the concept of ad hoc agency. 91 Stirling, a sole trader, entered into a construction contract with the defenders, in terms of which Stirling was to carry out refurbishment works at the defender's premises in St Annes. Shortly thereafter, a new company was formed: M & S Contracts Limited. Just as in McIntosh the intention was that the new company would take over the business of the partnership, so in Stirling the intention was that the new company would take over the business of the sole trader. Again, the sole trader's rights and liabilities under the construction contract were not validly transferred to the company. Many of the steps carried out under this contract were carried out in the name of the company. The company sought to refer the dispute to adjudication, but was forced to abandon this attempt when the defenders pointed out that it was not a party to the contract. The sole trader then sought to refer the dispute to adjudication.
The reported case is, in effect, an action by the sole trader seeking enforcement of the adjudicator's decision. Again, the concept of ad hoc agency was deployed to allow acts of the newly formed company (such as the writing of letters and submission of invoices) to be identified as acts on behalf of the sole trader. The fact that cheques had been paid into the company's bank account, and not that of the sole trader, was treated by Lord Drummond Young as a "matter of mere administrative convenience". 92 It was held that a dispute or difference had indeed existed between the sole trader and the defenders prior to the service of the notice of adjudication. The defender's objections to the enforcement of the adjudicator's decision were therefore repelled.
(c) Other possible uses of ad hoc agency
In McIntosh and Stirling, the concept of ad hoc agency was deployed to overcome errors which had occurred at the time of incorporation of a partnership or sole trader business into a limited company. Lord Drummond Young offered his concept for use in other contexts such as group company situations: 93 Within groups of companies, it is relatively common to find one company performing tasks for another company within the group. This may take many different forms; for present purposes, an example that is relevant is that one company may perform debt collection functions on behalf of other companies within the group. In such a case, the debts do not become due to the debt-collecting company; they remain due to the original contracting party, but the debt-collecting company acts as an agent for the contracting party in obtaining payment of the debts. . . That will commonly involve payment of debts into a bank account in the name of the debt-collecting company; the latter company's function is merely that of an agent, and the underlying contractual structures are not affected.
The solution can be applied even more widely:
94
Arrangements of this nature are found not only within groups of companies. . . at the level of natural persons, they are frequently encountered within a family. Nor are ad hoc agency relationships confined to routine tasks such as the collection of debts; they may also extend to more complex matters such as conducting negotiations over the performance of a contract.
(2) Methods of creation of an agency relationship
Agency in Scots law may arise either expressly, through offer and acceptance, or by implication from facts where the agent begins to act on behalf of the principal and the principal does not object to this course of conduct. 95 In such situations, the facts provide the basis from which inferences of an intention to be bound can be made. 96 Those inferences relate to both principal and agent: in other words, it must be clear that both principal and agent possess the intention to be bound.
97
Stair emphasised the need for this "core" agreement in relation to the gratuitous contract of mandate, 98 and modern agency law does not differ in this respect. In the three cases under discussion here, the agency relationship is a type of implied agreement. 99 It is, however, easier to make inferences of consent necessary to 94 form a contract where the supposed principal and agent engage in a course of dealing.
100
In the three cases under discussion, there was, of course, no offer and acceptance between the so-called principal and agent, nor was there what could be described as a course of dealing. In McIntosh and Stirling the agent performed a number of acts in the context of a single construction transaction. In Whitbread, the agent paid (or made repeated attempts to pay) a particular debt. Lord Drummond Young recognised the limited nature of the purported agency relationship in Whitbread, describing it as ". . . an agency relationship that comes into existence for the purpose of a single transaction only".
101
Scots law does recognise agency relationships which are created for limited purposes: an agent may be a limited or special agent, instructed to carry out a particular act on behalf of a principal.
102 Generally, where the agency relationship is implied, the standard of proof of agency is high. Agency must be established as a matter of fact supported by relevant averments, and there is certainly no presumption in favour of agency.
103 This approach to proof appears much stricter than Lord Drummond Young's approach. In Whitbread he addressed the issue of the consent or intention of the parties as follows: It is no doubt true that there was no actual intention on the part of the persons who issued the cheque that Fairbar should act as agent for Whitbread. Nevertheless, as the present case illustrates, the acts of large companies are frequently performed by the relatively junior employees acting under the corporate structures that have been set up to govern a multiplicity of transactions, with no regard to any particular transaction.
In those circumstances it is in my opinion quite unrealistic to attempt to attribute a specific intention to any individual or group of individuals. The corporate intention must be determined objectively, by examining both the individual transaction and the corporate structures under which it was effected.
Lord Drummond Young's approach here is unusual. Actions are often used as evidence of the underlying agreement of the parties. Thus, in the context of a sale, payment of money or tendering of goods act as evidence of the underlying intention necessary to form a contract of sale. Yet here, Lord Drummond Young identifies payment itself as creating the contract of agency. Payment in itself does not create a contract of agency -it simply acts as evidence from which inferences of intention can be made. Although the language used by Lord Drummond Young is suggestive of the idea of corporate attribution, i.e. that a person's intentions can be considered the intentions of a company, 105 he avoids identifying the specific person whose intention has this effect, and why those intentions should be attributed to Fairbar rather than Whitbread. Rather, he draws inferences from the circumstances as a whole. He explains: 106 Where . . . one person makes payment of another's debt, he normally does so as the agent of the debtor for the purpose of that particular transaction . . . That is in my opinion the natural inference from two facts (i) the existence of a debt owed by a debtor and (ii) the fact that payment is made in order to discharge that particular debt.
These inferences were sufficient, in his view, to indicate that a relationship of agency was created: "The obvious inference is accordingly that he makes payment on behalf of the debtor. That creates the relationship of ad hoc agency." 107 In Whitbread several unsuccessful attempts were made to pay the rent. One such attempt involved the tendering of a Fairbar cheque which was cashed but the sums ultimately re-credited, the landlords seeking to avoid the implication of consent to an assignation. The intention was, clearly, that Fairbar funds should be used to pay a Whitbread debt. 108 In a system such as Scots law where all individuals have by law a legal power to pay another's debt (subject to safeguards for the parties), it cannot be said that such a payment necessarily creates a relationship of ad hoc agency. It seems, therefore, that recourse to ad hoc agency was unnecessary in this case. The objective approach to the ascertainment of intention is again emphasised by Lord Drummond Young in McIntosh: 109 . . . I am of opinion that a reasonable man in the position of either the first or the second defenders would construe the claim document as being presented through the company but acting as agent for the true contracting party, the partnership. As a matter of commercial reality, that would plainly be a sensible way to proceed, avoiding the need for a formal assignation but permitting the active trading entity, the company, to progress matters on behalf of the true contracting party.
That would indeed have been "a sensible approach", but sensible approaches are not always taken! The directors of Laurence McIntosh Ltd would no doubt have been surprised had it been suggested to them that they were in fact acting as agents for a partnership which, although not dissolved, was inactive, all trading functions having been transferred to the newly formed company. The use of ad hoc agency here provided an escape route, bypassing the formal requirements of assignation. A solution which bypasses entirely the requirements of assignation, an important part of the law of obligations, is highly questionable.
The objective perspective applied by Lord Drummond Young allowed him to omit consideration of actual intention. As such, there was no need for him to address the issue of whether both principal and agent exhibited the consent necessary to establish agency. Rather than agency being the most likely interpretation of the facts, it was only one of a number of factual possibilities. It seems highly likely that none of the actors involved had addressed their minds to the possibility of agency. In McIntosh and Stirling, for example, the various actors seem to have been unaware of the legal consequences of incorporation of a company. Alternatively, they may have been aware but unwilling to devote the time necessary in order properly to deal with the legal consequences of incorporation.
Ad hoc agency operates in these cases as a "get out of jail free" card, available to parties who have failed properly to regulate their legal affairs. What is of greater concern is the effect this line of cases may have on the general principles of agency law. Were these cases to be used generally as precedents, it could threaten the previously established rules for formation of the agency relationship, undermining the role of consent in that relationship. One might also who by the hypothesis does not exist and therefore cannot have legal capacity. As a result, ad hoc agency is an inappropriate remedy to use where the partnership has been dissolved to make way for a newly incorporated company: agency principles do not allow an agent to act on behalf of a non-existent principal. The Partnership Act 1890 tempers the otherwise significant difficulties caused by the fact that partnerships are contracts involving delectus personae. In theory, a partnership is dissolved each time an individual partner leaves the partnership or dies.
119 Not surprisingly, this common law position is almost always amended in a written partnership agreement, thus allowing the partnership to continue to trade notwithstanding changes in its membership. Where there is no written partnership agreement section 38 of the 1890 Act comes into play, providing partners with limited authority following dissolution of the partnership " . . . to wind up the affairs of the partnership, and to complete transactions begun but unfinished at the time of the dissolution, but not otherwise". There is at least an argument that a newly formed company could benefit from these residual powers available to partners as agents involved in winding-up the non-existent partnership.
Although section 38 has been in force for over one hundred years, its parameters are not at all clear. A natural interpretation of the section limits the partners' authority to completing unfinished transactions, but not entering into new transactions. This interpretation was recently confirmed by Lord Reed, although he suggested that Scots law could be contrasted with English law in this respect. 120 So ad hoc agency may be unnecessary in cases where a company has been incorporated to perform the functions of a dissolved partnership. Section 38 of the 1890 Act arguably already provides a solution. Much would depend on the facts of the case, for example, the timing of the dissolution of the original partnership. The longer the time which has elapsed between dissolution and the exercise by the partners of their purported powers, the less likely those powers promoters concluding binding contracts on behalf of unincorporated companies. The promoter is personally bound under any purported contracts. In the UK, the company, once formed, cannot ratify the actions of the promoter, Kelner v Baxter (1866-1867) LR 2 CP 174. Interestingly, the United Kingdom approach to this question is more strict than that which applies in most other countries both within and outwith Europe. 
